Vol.13, No.2 | [Article] Assessing the Post-Cold War US Security Strategy and the Non-Proliferation of the Greater Middle East



Since the US lost a certain amount of its credibility among the international community with its 2003 Iraq invasion and the rise of China, there were analyses that the US unilateral hegemonic status would be degraded. However, there is still no ‘constraint structure’ which could damage US unilateralism. Moreover, in the global security environment of the 21st century where there is no player capable of substituting US hegemony, the strong will of the US to sustain its superiority and unilateralism cannot be ignored even if US power has actually decreased. In particular, in a situation in which there are many analyses viewing China’s potential to become a partner in a new G2 being hindered by it facing the ‘middle income trap’ the hyper-power or hyper-puissance of the US will continue for a considerable period of time.
Therefore, this paper will examine the US security strategy and its non-proliferation policy in more detail. It will bring better understanding of why it is important to contemplate US non-proliferation policy through the conceptual lens of coercive diplomacy within a US unipolar system. Moreover, this research will examine the validity of applying the framework of coercive diplomacy to the non-proliferation of the Greater Middle East, particularly which is related to Iran’s nuclear programmes and why it will be naturally dealt with theoretical framework of compellence.